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ABSTRACT. From its inception in 1987 social epistemology has been divided into analytic 
(ASE) and critical (CSE) approaches, represented by Alvin I. Goldman and Steve Fuller, 
respectively. In this paper, the agendas and some basic ideas of ASE and CSE are compared 
and assessed by bringing into the discussion also other participants of the debates on the 
social aspects of scientific knowledge – among them Raimo Tuomela, Philip Kitcher and 
Helen Longino. The six topics to be analyzed include individual and collective epistemic 
agents; the notion of scientific community; realism and constructivism; truth-seeking 
communities; epistemic and social values; science, experts, and democracy.      
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Introduction: Analytic and Critical Social Epistemology 
 
Social epistemology studies knowledge from a social point of view. As a complement to 
empirical studies, such as the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of science, social 
epistemology aims to provide a normative philosophical account of knowledge as a collective 
achievement. Even though the term dates from the 1950s, the work in this field started in 
1987 with a special issue of Synthese, edited by Frederick Schmitt, and the new journal 
Social Epistemology – A Journal of Knowledge, Culture, and Policy, founded by Steve 
Fuller. In the next year Fuller published a monograph with the title Social Epistemology. 
Alvin I. Goldman, who published in the 1987 Synthese issue an article on “Social 
Epistemics”, developed his reliabilist epistemology in the direction of social practices in his 
Knowledge in a Social World (1999). These studies attracted many other epistemologists and 
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philosophers of science as well. In the opening article of the new journal Episteme - A 
Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology, Anthony Quinton (2004) distinguished 
Goldman’s and Fuller’s approaches as the two main rivals of this new discipline, calling them 
Analytic Social Epistemology (ASE) and Critical Social Epistemology (CSE), respectively.1 
 The communication between ASE and CSE has been largely dysfunctional and 
rhetorically ineffective. Fuller (2012) argues that ASE has failed to make significant progress, 
as it is basically conservative and lacks understanding of actual knowledge processes. 
Goldman (1999), who refers to Fuller only in a footnote, claims that Fuller with many 
sociologists of science suffers from “veriphobia”. Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb, in their 
edited book Social Epistemology: Essential Readings (2011), mention only the early work 
Fuller (1988) in their extensive bibliography. Finn Collin (2011) has given a careful 
assessment of rival approaches, including a whole chapter on Fuller, but he concludes that 
science studies should adopt a “realist, veritistic, and reliabilist view of science”.         
 The tension between ASE and CSE can be seen to arise from a difference in the 
personalities of their main proponents: while Goldman is a careful and even pedantic analytic 
philosopher, Fuller is lively thinker who loves to be provocative. In my view, Fuller has not 
properly appreciated the richness and prospects of the growing analytic program, but on the 
other hand Fuller’s own position is hard to classify in standard philosophical terms. The main 
difference between the two approaches appears to be their distinctive agendas, but these 
agendas may reflect deeper differences within the underlying ontological, epistemological, 
methodological, ethical and political standpoints. 
  The six topics to be analyzed in this paper include individual and collective epistemic 
agents (Section 1), the notion of scientific community (Section 2), realism and constructivism 
(Section 3), truth-seeking communities (Section 4), epistemic and social values in science 
(Section 5), science, experts, and democracy (Section 6). While Fuller has been skeptical 
about Goldman’s way of treating collective epistemic agents, there is clearly a need to make 
the analytic models of collective knowledge sociologically more realistic. For this reason, 
ASE and CSE are compared in this paper by bringing into the discussion also other 
                                                          
1 In this paper I cannot discuss David Bloor’s Strong Programme as an important strand of social epistemology 
(but see Niiniluoto 1999, pp. 252-267). For defenses of the Edinburgh school, see Kusch (2011, 2018). 
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participants of the debates on the social aspects of scientific knowledge – among them Raimo 
Tuomela, Philip Kitcher, and Helen Longino. 
 
1. Individual and Collective Epistemic Agents 
 
Steve Fuller’s new journal Social Epistemology in 1987 was announced to be based on “the 
assumption that a key feature of a claim’s epistemological status is its need to be certified by 
an appropriate social group before passing as knowledge”. In his review 25 years later, Fuller 
(2012) declares that his starting point has been “the elusiveness of consensus in science”. In 
spite of such reservations about the idea of consensus, the main line of Critical Social 
Epistemology is to consider social groups as the carriers of knowledge. 
 Starting with Plato’s definition of episteme, traditional epistemology attributed 
knowledge to individual subjects: knowing that as a propositional attitude is a relation 
between an individual X and a proposition p so that (i) X believes that p, (ii) p is true, and 
(iii) X has justification for p. Condition (iii) was typically spelled out by requirements that X 
can prove that p, or p is evident for X, or X can reliably perceive that p. Modern 
philosophers, who developed empiricist and probabilistic theories of knowledge, recognized 
that in many everyday activities our knowledge has to rely on the testimony of other people. 
Thus, X has justification for p if X learns that p from a testimony. For example, in a court one 
can trust the testimony of two independently agreeing witnesses, and in education we can 
trust the testimony of the best scientists. 
 The notions of trust and testimony have been important topics in Analytic Social 
Epistemology, as one can see in the contents of the representative collection Social 
Epistemology (2010), edited by Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard (cf. Goldman 2010). In such 
studies, the doxastic or epistemic agent is an individual who receives input – via agreement 
and disagreement - from other members of a community. Goldman’s Knowledge in a Social 
World (1999) investigates which “social practices will promote knowledge rather than 
subvert it”, but is still for the most part based on the model of individual epistemic agents, as 
“collective entities as potential knowing agents” are only rarely discussed (ibid., p. 5). At this 
point Fuller’s general criticism has been that Goldman’s treatment is too squarely based on 
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methodological individualism, too aprioristic and formalistic, and too close to the standard 
notion of rational agent in microeconomics, while Fuller has not really developed his 
alternative of methodological holism. However, in the recent collection of “essential 
readings” in ASE Goldman makes room for approaches with collective doxastic agents and 
systems by including essays of Christian List on judgment aggregation in groups and Philip 
Pettit on “Groups with Minds of Their Own” (see Goldman and Whitcomb 2011).  
 The notions of belief and knowledge have been extended to collective agents in 
analytic studies of social groups (see Tuomela 1984; Gilbert 1989; cf. Niiniluoto 2003). 
Raimo Tuomela (1995) further defines the notion of “we-intention” for social groups. The 
concept of group belief would not be very interesting, if it were simply reduced to the 
summative condition that all members (or the majority of members) of G believe that p. Let 
us denote this by BGp: 
 
(1)  BGp = for every a in G, Bap. 
 
where Bap means that a believes that p. Such a numerical condition could be applied to any 
accidental collection of individuals, and it would fail to express the idea that there are 
relations or ties between the members of the group, so that the belief of a group is a sort of 
social or joint action. An influential new approach was suggested by David Lewis (1969) in 
his analysis of “conventions”. According to Lewis, group commitments as conventions 
involve iterated epistemic or doxastic operators. In this sense, it is common knowledge in 
community C that p if and only if (almost) everyone in C has reason to believe that p and 
(almost) everyone in C has reason to believe that (almost) everyone in C has reason to believe 
that p. 
 Margaret Gilbert (1989) defines group beliefs by joint acceptance, where a group G 
jointly accepts that p if and only if “it is common knowledge in G that the members of G 
individually have intentionally and openly expressed their willingness to accept that p with 
the other members of G as a body”. Tuomela (1995) in turn defines mutual belief that p in a 
group G by the requirement that all members of G believe that p, all members of G believe 
that all members of G believe that p, etc. 
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(2)  MBGp = BGp & BGBGp & ... 
 
To avoid the idealization that group beliefs always involve an infinite number of sub-beliefs, 
Tuomela suggests that the number of iterations of the operator BG can be stopped at some 
finite number n, and after n it is required that the members of G are disposed to form a 
similar belief at the level n+1 (ibid., p. 43). Then the shared we-belief that p in group G is 
defined by the condition that every member of G believes that p and also believes that it is a 
mutual belief in G that p: 
 
(3)   For every a in G, Bap and BaMBGp 
 
(ibid., p. 325). However, (3) is equivalent to BGp & BGMBGp, so that (2) and (3) are 
essentially the same condition - with the only difference that (3) contains one more iteration 
of the BG-operator than (2).            
 The notion of shared we-belief is egalitarian in the sense that it is completely 
symmetric with respect to the group members. Tuomela contrasts it with what he calls proper 
group beliefs which assume some hierarchical authority system in the group. He divides the 
group G into a set H of “operative agents”, whose social role is to form the views of the 
whole group G, and to “non-operative agents” in S = G-H who accept the views of H on the 
basis of their authority. The non-operative members in S are assumed to be full-fledged and 
adequately informed about the beliefs of the operative members in H, and their beliefs are 
based upon information about the beliefs of H (ibid., p. 319). Tuomela characterizes the 
epistemic position of the members of S as “tacit acceptance” A which is weaker than belief B 
or explicit acceptance (ibid., p. 327). Then, with some simplifications, group G believes that 
p if and only if every member of H believes that p, there is a mutual belief among H that 
every member of H believes that p, all members of S tend to tacitly accept p, and there is a 
mutual belief in the whole group G that all members of S tend to tacitly accept p (ibid., p. 
315). More formally, these conditions can be expressed by  
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(4)  MBHp & ASp & MBGASp. 
 
Thus, the key idea of this account is that the members of S are willing to learn from the 
operative members of H.  
 Definition (4) could be modified so that, instead of using the new category of “tacit 
belief”, the members of S have conditional beliefs or conditional commitments to beliefs, 
given beliefs about the opinions of the authorities. These conditional formulations allow that 
a group G believes that p even though only the subgroup H of G actually (mutually) believes 
that p, while the rest of the group would believe that p on some additional conditions. 
 Refinements of condition (4) could be formulated in terms of probability theory. Our 
willingness to learn from other persons depends on their reliability, i.e., on the probability 
that they are speaking the truth (cf. Kitcher 1993). Lehrer and Wagner (1981) consider groups 
where members give weights to each other, and then modify their personal probability of p 
by a method of iterated aggregation. One person respects another if the associated weight is 
non-zero. They show that group consensus does not presuppose positive respect between all 
pairs of members in the group: the aggregation method converges to a consensual probability 
of p, assuming that there a chain of positive mutual respect between all members of the 
group. 
 Assuming that we have succeeded in analyzing group beliefs, group knowledge could 
be defined by adding the truth condition and a collective justification condition: 
 
(5)  KGp = BGp & p & JGp, 
 
where JGp states that the group G has a justification for p. Gilbert (1989), p. 314, suggests 
briefly that JGp might be analyzed by the requirement that there is some condition j such that 
the members of G jointly accept j as a justification for p. If J(j,p) means that j is a justification 
for p, then this requirement could be defined in terms of mutual beliefs: 
 
(6)  J(j,p) & MBGJ(j, p). 
 
 
 
 
7 
Alternatively, instead of this kind of shared we-justification, (6) could also reflect the 
authority structure in group G: in analogy with Tuomela’s proper group belief (4), j is 
accepted as a justification for p by the operative members H of G, and the other non-
operative members in S accept j as a justification for p on the authority of H. 
 Again, the authority account could be modified so that the members of S do not know 
the justification j that H has found for p, but they would accept it if they knew it. In other 
words, the members of S trust the authorities in H, when the representatives of H claim to 
have evidence for p. This is typical in everyday life, when we rely on the testimony by eye-
witnesses or official broadcasting companies. As we shall see in Section 6, this kind of 
authority structure is important also in the case of science. 
 
2. The Scientific Community as a Collective Epistemic Agent 
 
Historically the most important example of a collective epistemic agent comes from science. 
With the progress of science during the Renaissance, it was realized that science is a form of 
social knowledge whose results are produced by the joint action of investigators. This led to 
the insight that the proper subject of scientific knowledge is the scientific community (cf. 
Niiniluoto 2003). 
 The vision of science as a cooperative activity was expressed by Francis Bacon in the 
Salomon’s House of The New Atlantis in 1627. The Royal Society in the 1660s provided in 
practice a model of a research institution (see Shapin and Shaffer 1985). Together with the 
establishment of scientific journals, it served to define the classical ethos of science (cf. 
Merton 1973). With the gradual institutionalization of science the professional role of a 
scientist was finally defined in the nineteenth century (cf. Ben-David 1971). From the 
perspective of Durkheimian social anthropology, the institution of science can be seen to 
involve both individual and collective agents (see Douglas 1986). 
 The notion of the “scientific community” is often traced to articles published by 
Michael Polanyi and Robert Merton in 1942. Polanyi considered a “society of explorers” as 
an invisible collectivity that evolves its own norms and policies (see Polanyi 1967). This 
leads naturally to the sociological definition of the scientific community as “the network of 
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communication and social relationships between scientists working in given fields or in all 
the fields” (Ben-David 1971, p. 3; Hagstrom 1965). 
 Thus, the widest macro-sociological conception identifies the scientific community (in 
the singular) with the collectivity of the actually existing scientists in all fields of research. A 
narrower approach is favored by Thomas Kuhn (1970), p. 177, who takes a scientific 
community to consist of the practitioners of a scientific specialty (e.g., physicists, 
astronomers). According to Kuhn, in “normal science” the members of such a community 
share a “paradigm”, so that conversely a scientific community can be defined as a group 
which shares a paradigm. Even narrower definitions of scientific communities (in the plural) 
divide disciplines into areas of subject matters, such as physical optics and electricity, 
yielding groups with typically about one hundred specialists as their members (ibid., p. 178). 
 Science can be viewed as a cooperative activity also on a micro-sociological level: 
most work in natural science, medicine, and psychology is based on the activities of research 
groups. The members of such groups usually get their salaries from the same employer, 
conduct experiments together, and publish research reports with joint authorship. 
 The micro-sociological definitions are institutional in the sense that they identify the 
scientific communities with historically existing finite groups of persons who work together 
in the same place or at least are trying to jointly solve the same research problems. The 
membership of such groups is usually definable in an unambiguous way. But the wider 
disciplinary definitions are already problematic. While it may be easy to agree that painters, 
dancers, politicians, and priests do not constitute scientific communities, what is the status of 
such professions as engineers, economists, and historians? How do we distinguish science 
from pseudo-scientific activities like astrology and scientology? 
 The latter issue is known as the demarcation problem of distinguishing science from 
non-science (see Niiniluoto 1984, Ch. 1). Some of the proposed criteria are epistemological 
in the sense that they refer to the special kind of knowledge that is supposed to be achievable 
in science. For example, Norman Campbell in What is Science? (1921) defined science as 
“the study of those judgments concerning which universal agreement can be obtained”. Some 
criteria are methodological in the sense that they refer to specific types of methods that are 
applied in science. For example, in 1934 Popper characterized scientific hypotheses as those 
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which are in principle falsifiable by observational statements (cf. Popper 1963).
 Methodological characterizations of science were anticipated already by the 
pragmatist Charles S. Peirce in his “The Fixation of Belief” in 1878. Peirce described science 
as the pursuit of truth by using the “self-corrective” method. He argued that the ultimate 
opinion of “all who investigate” is fated or destined to converge to the truth, provided they 
are using the scientific method (CP 5.407): “truth is that concordance of an abstract statement 
with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief” 
(CP 5.565). In “The Doctrine of Chances” (1878), Peirce stated that “logic is rooted in the 
social principle”: in order to guarantee that the process of investigation carries different 
minds to the same conclusion, we have to identify our interests “with those of an unlimited 
community” (CP 2.654). 
 Peirce’s early definition introduces the scientific community as an ideal 
epistemological concept which is not restricted by time and place. Rather, the membership is 
open to anyone who identifies his or her interests with the pursuit of truth, and this ideal 
community has actual, past, future, and even potential members. This philosophical notion is 
thus broader than any sociological definition of a community. Peirce’s approach has been 
followed by Karl-Otto Apel (1980) and Jürgen Habermas (1998) who employ the conception 
of the ideal communication or discourse community in their “transcendental pragmatics”.  
 Even though the ideal communities of Peirce and Habermas have to be distinguished 
from actually existing groups and auditories, they may still serve as ideal types in Max 
Weber’s sense: real scientific collectives may be compared to the normative standards. And 
the methodological and ethical norms, even though they are sometimes violated by the actual 
behavior of the scientists, may still be in force in the sense that they are accepted as valid 
constitutive requirements for good science – and violation of the good practice of science 
may lead to sanctions. 
 The definition (5) of group knowledge KGp involves the condition that p is true. In 
practice, we do not have direct access to the truth values of propositions (cf. Section 4), and 
for fallibilists like Peirce and Popper the best indicator of truth is the assessment of the 
scientific community. Popper emphasized that a theory can “temporarily and tentatively be 
accepted as part of current scientific teaching” only if it is able to withstand critical 
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discussion by the scientific community better than its competitors (Popper 1972, p. 261). This 
more flexible time-dependent notion of scientific knowledge can be given in institutional 
terms. Following the Lewisian idea of conventions, one can develop a general 
“conventionalist” theory of social institutions (Lagerspetz 1989; cf. Searle 1995): an 
institution I exists for a community C if and only if the members of C jointly accept (or 
mutually believe in) the existence of I. Examples of such institutions could include money, 
the legal order in a country, and language as a system of norms. Martin Kusch (1993) 
suggests that “folk psychology” could be understood as a social institution. Similarly, an 
institutional account of scientific knowledge states that 
 
(7)  Proposition p belongs to the scientific knowledge at time t 
 = The scientific community at time t accepts p as true. 
 
For example, quantum mechanics belongs to the scientific knowledge of our age if and only 
if the present scientific community accepts quantum mechanics as true. Those antirealist 
philosophers, who do not think that science seeks the truth, can drop the last two words “as 
true” in (7). This is what in fact happens with Fuller, when he states that “having knowledge 
is ultimately a matter of having credibility” in the sense that fellow researchers use their 
resources to follow up or cite the work of another researcher (see Fuller 1988, p. 30).     
 We shall return to this institutional account in Section 5. Here it is interesting to link 
definition (7) to the analysis of Section 2. Brad Way (2007) has argued that scientific 
knowledge can be possessed only by research teams, not by specialty communities or the 
scientific community as a whole. It is correct that research groups may have joint knowledge, 
if community acceptance is analyzed by an egalitarian model like (3). But the virtue of the 
alternative approach (4) with the distinction between operative and other members is that the 
institutional definition (7) makes sense for the wide sociological concept of the scientific 
community.     
  
3. Realism and Constructivism 
 
 
 
 
11 
One of the underlying differences between ASE and CSE concerns the ontological 
conception of reality. Goldman is a well-known scientific realist who accepts the independent 
existence of the natural world and the possibility of finding objective truths about reality (see 
also Kitcher 1993; Niiniluoto 1999). Among his enemies he mentions various kinds of 
“constructivists” and “revisionists”, including Fuller in this group. 
 This somewhat crude classification does not do justice to Fuller’s intricate position. 
His 1988 work shows his broad knowledge of contemporary currents within the philosophy 
of science. Fuller distances himself from the scientific realists by concluding that “antirealism 
would seem to be the ultimate solution to the problem of realism” (Fuller 1988, p. 98). But he 
adds that “although sociologist of knowledge are, understandably, antirealists about the 
entities produced by physicists, they need not be antirealists about social entities as well” 
(ibid., p. 65). This combination of theoretical antirealism about nature and realism about 
society is repeated in his next book Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents (1989), p. 3, 
but it need not imply an antirealism about our everyday material environment. At the same 
time, Fuller criticizes sociologists of science, such as “New Wavers“ (Bruno Latour and 
Karin Knorr-Cetina) and “the Strong Programme” of the Edinburgh School of David Bloor 
and Barry Barnes, for their inability to adequately treat normative questions about science. As 
his own alternative, Fuller proposes a “panglossian epistemology” which studies the actual 
production and distribution of knowledge through its material embodiments (see Fuller 
1993). This approach may be motivated by Fuller’s ontological stance, but it is criticized by 
Helen Longino for the loss of genuine normative questions about knowledge (Longino 2002a, 
p. 172).           
 Fuller (2004) continues the debate between ASE and CSE in his article on 
“Descriptive vs. Revisionary Social Epistemology”. According to him, ASE is conservative 
or “descriptive” in the sense that it wishes to justify the world as it is, while the “revisionary” 
CSE studies how to construct alternative realities and futures. Antirealism for Fuller means 
“to treat reality as something resisted and overcome rather than accepted and imitated”. In 
Fuller (2012), he characterizes himself as a “realizationist”: “I believe that we increasingly 
come to turn into reality whatever we conceive”. As an instance of this “proactionary” 
attitude he mentions the transhumanist project of creating “Humanity 2.0”. For CSE, this 
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recommends the task of socially constructing epistemic standards (rather than assessing 
knowledge claims by already accepted standard), which is in harmony with the original 
framework of the journal Social Epistemology to use empirical research “as a guide for 
directing contemporary knowledge enterprises”. 
 As a comparison between ASE and CSE this account is suggestive but problematic. 
The scientific realists typically assume that there are mind-independent features and laws 
about the natural world, but they also acknowledge the possibility of manipulating nature and 
transforming reality into material artefacts. They may also follow Popper (1972) in accepting 
in their ontology a human-made “World 3” of cultural and social institutions and abstract 
entities (see Niiniluoto 2006). Such philosophers are realists about nature as well as society. 
Further, they need not be determinists, so that they can conceive the future as an open “tree” 
with many not-yet-realized possibilities.    
 It is also pertinent to remark that ontological realism is compatible with conceptual 
pluralism: the world can be categorized in alternative ways with different conceptual 
frameworks, but still we can maintain the correspondence theory of truth (see Niiniluoto 
1999, Tambolo 2014). Philip Kitcher, with his new interests in social issues about science 
and democracy, has moved from his earlier “monism” (i.e. the world has a unique structure 
which can be represented in a complete theory) to “modest realism” which combines truth as 
correspondence with conceptual relativity (see Kitcher 2001; Diéguez 2011). His 2001 book 
includes chapters on “the world as find it” and “the world as we make it”. As our concepts 
draw new boundaries in nature, “science, or, more generally, inquiry, is constitutive of the 
world in which we live” (Kitcher 2011).  
 
4. Truth-Seeking Communities 
 
Alvin Goldman’s epistemology characterizes justification by the reliability condition: a belief 
is justified if it is obtained by a reliable process, where “the reliability of a practice is 
measured by the ratio of truths to total number of beliefs a practice would foster” (Goldman 
1987, p. 128). This is in line with Peirce’s account of probability in terms of truth-
frequencies: a mode of argument can be assessed by its ability to yield true conclusion from 
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true premises. So, for example, the truth-frequency of deductive entailment is one, and color 
perception in normal circumstances gives a correct belief in almost all cases. A detailed 
account of this “veritistic epistemology” is given in Goldman (1999). 
 Goldman’s approach can be compared to other recent analyzes of truth-seeking and 
truth approximation. Following Popper (1963) and Levi (1968), many scientific realists point 
out that the aim of science should be a balance between truth and information. In science, we 
are not interested in just any truths, such as trivial tautologies, but rather in informative truths 
which describe and explain reality. And, as science is a fallible enterprise with a risk of error, 
we aim at hypothetical theories which are close to the truth. Popper (1972) tried to capture 
these ideas with his notion of truthlikeness or verisimilitude (see Niiniluoto 1987). This 
approach gives an alternative to Goldman’s version of veritism, where the success and 
progress of epistemic practices is measured by increasing truthlikeness (see Niiniluoto 1984, 
1999). Thus, Goldman’s “V-values” as truth-ratios or truth-frequencies are replaced by 
measures of truthlikeness or their estimates. In this spirit, one can study the veritistic value of 
logical models of belief revision and dynamic doxastic logic (van Ditmarsch et al. 2007), 
which usually have been defined in terms of consistency and preservation of information 
instead of truth (see Niiniluoto 2011). Another application is to study whether belief merging 
(i.e. combining two possibly conflicting belief systems into one) is a successful method of 
truth approximation (see Cevolani 2014). 
 Goldman’s veritism – or its alternatives – can formally be applied within the context 
of individualist epistemology, but it has a natural extension to social epistemology. Thus, 
ASE studies “social practices in terms of their impact on the truth-values of agents’ beliefs” 
(Goldman 2010). Related work on “opinion dynamics” (Hegselmann and Krause 2006) has 
been done by using sophistical computer simulations. This project can be combined with the 
institutional characterization of science, given by the condition (7). Some reservations to 
“consensualism” were given already by Goldman (1987), since mere agreement or consensus 
of a community is not sufficient to warrant that its outcome is qualified as knowledge. If we 
wish to speak about scientific knowledge, not just about scientific beliefs, the sociological 
definition of the scientific community should allow a reference to the scientific method: the 
consensual acceptance of p should be justified in the sense that the community has applied 
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the critical methods of scientific inquiry to test the correctness of p, and p has turned out to be 
the best available hypothesis in the light of this scrutiny.  
 Goldman (1999) attacks all “veriphobic” approaches which talk about institutionalized 
beliefs without introducing the requirements of truth and justification. The tendency of 
reducing scientific knowledge merely to the collective beliefs of scientists is illustrated by the 
sociologists of science. The Edinburgh School starts from the methodological symmetry 
principle, which states that all beliefs – true or false, rational or irrational – should be 
explained by same kinds of social reasons, so that the empirical study of science is not based 
on any prejudice on the credibility and objectivity of science. Also Latour’s laboratory 
studies slide from not assuming that science is rational to assuming that science is not rational 
(see Niiniluoto 1999, p. 270). In the STS-studies of science, technology and society, the most 
popular message has been that “scientific knowledge has no privileged claim to truth”, all 
belief systems are “on a common epistemological footing”, and the scientists are not 
guardians of objective knowledge but “hired brains of special interests and lobbyists of their 
own” (see Cozzens and Woodhouse 1995). In contrast, Goldman’s scientific realism 
promises to give an argument for the thesis of “comparative scientific superiority” that 
“scientific practices are veritistically better than any set of non-scientific practices” (Goldman 
1999, p. 247; cf. Kitcher, 1993). This debate was one of the main issues of the Science Wars 
in the 1990s. 
 It should be remembered that the scientific realists have been fighting in another front 
within the philosophy of science against instrumentalists (who deny that theories have truth 
values), constructive empiricists (who restrict the truth requirement to observational 
statements), pragmatists (who give up the correspondence theory of truth), and 
epistemological anarchists (who reject the notion of truth altogether). Thomas Kuhn argued 
that a theory-independent notion of truth is incoherent, and Larry Laudan followed him in 
defining scientific progress by the problem-solving capacity of scientific traditions. 
 It was the antirealist Laudan (1977) who introduced the “arationality principle” that 
“the sociology of knowledge may step in to explain beliefs if and only if those beliefs cannot 
be explained in terms of their rational merits”. However, for Laudan truth is a utopian goal, 
and the rationality of a belief does not equal its truth. Thus, when Helen Longino (2002a) 
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interprets “the rational – social dichotomy” so that some realist philosophers tend to “equate 
social forces with ‘bias’”, Kitcher (2002) quickly replies that for him and Goldman social 
factors need not be contrary to the rationality and progressiveness of the sciences. Indeed, it 
is up to the program of ASE to study which social practices are truth-conducive and which 
are not.  
 Fuller (2012) complains that Goldman mislabels his position as “veriphobic”. Fuller’s 
background in post-Kuhnian philosophy of science and the STS-studies, and his 
instrumentalist antirealism, can be seen in a little book Science (1997), which argues that the 
sciences pretend to have a privileged access to the nature of reality, but strategically 
misinterpret their own history and fail to live up to their own ideals of rationality. But Fuller 
(2003) also argues that in the Kuhn – Popper debate in the 1960s it was Popper who gave a 
better account of the aims and ambitions of science. So, on the whole, it appears that Fuller is 
not so much occupied with the debates on realism and the notion of truth, but rather is more 
interested in questions concerning the distribution of knowledge (see Section 6). 
    
5. Epistemic and Social Values 
 
Starting in the late 1930s, a classical analysis of the normative structure of science was given 
by the sociologist of science Robert K. Merton (see Merton 1973). He argued that “the ethos 
of science” is constituted by the norms of “universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and 
organized skepticism”. He also analyzed the reward system of science which gives 
recognition to the scientist who has first published a research discovery. This reward system 
is operated by the practice of scientific journals to publish papers on the basis of peer review. 
Even though the competition for resources in science has become more and more intense, 
quality assurance is still largely accomplished by referees and panels representing peers from 
the scientific community. 
 Many later sociologists have challenged the validity of Merton’s ethos in the new 
environment of commercially oriented Big Science (see Ziman 1994). In particular, the ideas 
of impersonality and disinterestedness have been questioned, and case studies have been 
presented to show that at least sometimes social interests have influenced the success of some 
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scientific opinions. Fuller (1988), p. 12, points out that “Old Wave sociology of knowledge” 
had an equivocal reading of the thesis that all knowledge is “interest-laden”, since it failed to 
distinguish three different groups in relation to the acceptance of a knowledge claim: 
motivators (who hope that they might benefit), benefitters (who actually benefit), and users 
(who use the claim in proposing other knowledge claims). But one should distinguish the 
actual behavior of scientists in various circumstances and the norms governing their actions. 
It is still a fundamental principle of science that a knowledge claim cannot be supported or 
justified by appealing to its potential in satisfying some personal, political, economical, or 
religious interests. Violations of this norm of objectivity, if detected, will be corrected by 
other scientists. 
 These observations suggest that the norms of science are social institutions in the 
sense discussed in Section 2. Speaking generally, 
 
(8) Principle n is a norm of science if and only if n is jointly accepted by the scientific 
community.         
 
This means that all (or most) members of the scientific community follow n in their behavior 
and expect that all (or most of) the other members follow n. A similar analysis can be given 
of the values of science: they are not simply virtues or attributes of individual scientists but 
institutional commitments. For example, the guiding principles of research ethics include the 
values of honesty (against fraud and fabrication of data), fairness (against plagiarism), and 
responsibility (concern for environmentally, culturally or socially harmful applications of 
science) (see Niiniluoto 2007). Research integrity is not only a property that a scientist may 
or may not have, but a social norm about good scientific practice whose violations 
(misconduct and fraud) are in many countries examined and sanctioned by special ethical 
committees or advisory boards. 
In this normative sense, universities and research institutions are value-based 
organizations whose ethos includes goals like truth, knowledge, critical attitude, creativity, 
autonomy, and social responsibility. Scientific research is governed by epistemic or 
evidential norms which concern public observability of research data, repeatability of 
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experiments, and empirical testability of theories. Following Carl Hempel’s terminology, it is 
often said that the epistemic utilities, or the standards for assessing quality of success in 
knowledge-seeking, include truth, information, scope, truthlikeness, consistency, coherence, 
confirmation, understanding, explanatory power, predictive power, accuracy, and simplicity. 
These epistemic values are intrinsic indicators of truth, so that their institutional acceptance 
satisfies Goldman’s idea of veritistic ASE. 
Helen Longino (2002a), who argues that science as social knowledge is value-laden, 
adds to the epistemic principles social norms governing the critical discursive interactions 
between the community of investigators. These norms concern the availability of venues for 
criticism, responsiveness for criticism, publicly recognized standards for evaluating inquiry, 
and tempered equality of intellectual authority. We shall return to the last condition in 
Section 6, but otherwise we see that her conditions resemble Popper’s (1963) plea for critical 
discussion and Habermas’s (1998) model of ideal discourse. What is more, Longino’s norms 
can be seen to promote the attainment of truth, so that they also satisfy the aims of ASE. 
In the same way, one can argue that the ethical norm of honesty is an “extrinsic 
epistemic value” in the sense that its validity in the scientific community helps to eliminate 
errors and achieve truths (see Rolin 2015). Also fairness as the other main principle of 
research ethics plays the role of an extrinsic epistemic value, since as a constitutive rule of 
the reward system it helps the scientific community to maintain its spirit and effort in truth-
seeking.  
The intrinsic and extrinsic epistemic value-ladenness of science is compatible with the 
normative principle of objectivity. Arguments to the effect that sometimes the scientists are 
permitted or obliged to appeal to non-epistemic values in their acceptance of knowledge 
claims are not convincing. One of these arguments refers to the underdetermination of 
theories by empirical data, but a scientist always has the option of suspending judgment and 
searching for more relevant evidence to decide the matter (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 176). Another 
argument, due Richard Rudner (1953), suggests that the acceptance of a hypothesis should 
take into account the “inductive risk” in acting upon this hypothesis. But we need not assume 
with the “behaviouralists” or pragmatists that the cognitive acceptance of a hypothesis means 
the same as the decision to act as if the hypothesis were true (Niiniluoto 2012). Already Isaac 
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Levi (1967) convincingly argued in his cognitive decision theory that the tentative acceptance 
of scientific hypotheses can be based upon their epistemic utilities – without appealing to 
other value judgments. 
Here it is relevant to take up the distinctions between science and technology and 
between basic and applied research.2 Kitcher (2001) refers to Niiniluoto (1993), but notes 
that these distinctions are problematic or “not simple”. In his reply to Antonio Bereijo, 
Kicther doubts the practical relevance of these distinctions, and tells that his discussion of the 
“Myth of Purity” was intended to undermine “a standard defense of insulating certain kinds 
of scientific research against critiques that invoke ethical, social, and political values” (see 
Gonzalez 2011, p. 376). So Kitcher is in fact interested in the third basic norm of research 
ethics, viz. responsibility. Again it is relevant to separate the motivations of individual 
scientists and the institutional norm. In this respect, the distinctions help to show that 
different types of research and technology are value-laden in quite different ways (see 
Niiniluoto, 2014).       
      The OECD distinction between research (“the pursuit of new knowledge”) and 
development (the use of results of research “to develop new products, methods, and means of 
production”) repeats the old Aristotelian distinction between scientia and techne. At least for 
a scientific realist, this R & D divide matches with the distinction between science and 
technology: science seeks knowledge, technology designs artifacts, and development is 
science-based technology (cf. Niiniluoto 1984). Pragmatists and instrumentalists, who see 
science as a problem-solving rather than a truth-seeking activity, instead tend to blur the 
difference between R and D with new catchword “technoscience” (cf. Niiniluoto 2016). 
The OECD handbook makes a further distinction between basic and applied research. 
The former (fundamental, curiosity-driven, blue skies research) seeks knowledge for its own 
sake “without the aim of specific application”, the latter pursues “knowledge with the aim of 
obtaining a specific goal”. The historical background of this divide can be found in Francis 
                                                          
2 One of the referees fears that the treatment of knowledge production in terms of epistemic values may appear 
detached from “any overarching conception of humanity”. I argue below that applied research and technology 
(even though their truth claims are grounded in epistemic criteria as well) leave ample room for ethical, 
ecological, and social values which serve to promote the survival and well-being of humanity. Democratic 
science policy with educated citizens is the best warrant for the implementation of such humane values.      
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Bacon’s early 17th century program of the scientification of technology: “knowledge is 
power” in the sense that knowledge about causal laws helps us to produce desired things or to 
prevent undesired outcomes. The idea of systematically searching such practical knowledge 
was realized – historically parallel to applied arts – in the late 19th century by the emerging 
engineering sciences and agricultural sciences (cf. Roll-Hansen 2017).  
One way of looking at these conceptual distinctions is in terms of the related value 
goals. Pure science and applied science both seek knowledge, but for the former justified 
truths have intrinsic value while the latter is interested in their instrumental value. On the 
other hand, various kinds of practical utilities are relevant and appropriate in technology – 
and more generally in human decision-making in politics, economy, and everyday life. Each 
artifact has its intended use (or “final cause” in Aristotle’s sense), and possibly some 
unintended side-effects. Different branches of technology have their own specific goals, such 
as power, speed, and security for airplane engineering. Such values can be used as goals to be 
pursued by means of design methods. In Technology Assessment (TA), they serve as criteria 
of the success of technical tools and products. As a summary of such assessment, one can 
propose the formula TA = 6E + S (see Niiniluoto 1997). Here the six E’s are 
 
- Effectiveness (ability to achieve the intended use or function) 
- Economical efficiency (cost-benefit success) 
- Ergonomics (relations to the health of users)  
- Ecology (relations to the health of the natural environment)  
- Esthetics (beauty) 
- Ethics (good or bad by moral standards). 
 
Finally, S refers to the social impact of technical tools. The formula of TA shows that 
technological products are value-laden in quite different sense that the epistemic search for 
truth in science.  
Basic research seeks informative truths which describe and explain reality. Applied 
research combines truth-seeking with the requirement of relevance. Typically it is practiced 
as a design science which seeks knowledge about means – ends relations, so that its results 
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can be expressed as technical norms of the form  
 
(TN) If you want A, and believe that you are in situation B, then you ought to do X. 
 
(See Niiniluoto 2014.) This notion of design science covers a variety of fields like evidence-
based clinical medicine, synthetic biology, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, applied 
social sciences, and policy studies (see Niiniluoto 2013). It is important to note that the 
justification of technical norms can be objective or value-neutral in the sense that it relies on 
theoretical and empirical information about the causal or lawlike connection between X and 
A in situation B. Such claims, which can be assessed by epistemic utilities, are derived from 
basic research, which gives a fair reason to support independent fundamental research in 
science policy – instead of the currently common rhetoric in favor of innovations with short-
term benefits.  
Further, in the justification of a technical norm TN a commitment of the researcher to 
the conditional value A is not needed. Technical oughts are binding only for those who 
accept the antecedent value premise of the technical norm. For example, a pacifist may accept 
the results of military studies, and a militarist may approve the conditional conclusions of 
peace research – even though they will disagree in the social and political relevance of their 
respective fields. Still, the conditional norm TN is indispensably value-laden in the sense that 
it essentially involves a value premise as its antecedent. Hence, design sciences do not satisfy 
any principle of value-freedom which would require that all value terms are excluded from 
their language. 
 This account of applied design sciences allows that any social value could take 
the place of the value A of a technical norm. Such values are not criteria for accepting the 
theories or models which are used to justify the claims of design sciences, but rather they are 
antecedents of technical norms or conditional recommendations of action. The value A is 
typically not a motivation of an individual researcher, but an institutional motive e.g. for 
defense, health, welfare, agriculture, or environmental protection. The promotion of such 
motives usually takes place in special institutes of applied and sectorial research. 
 It can be suggested that this model of design sciences gives a conceptual tool of 
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making a difference between conservative and radical inquiry – something that Fuller strives 
for in his discussion of descriptive and revisionary SE. Basic sciences are indeed descriptive 
and explanatory, while design sciences give rules for changing the world. Especially in the 
social sciences the end A may be conservative (preservation of status quo), reformist 
(Popperian piecemeal social engineering) or emancipatory (radical changes in the social 
order). For example, the aim A may be to improve the conditions of politically marginalized 
or socially oppressed groups of people (see Niiniluoto 1999, p. 251, for a proposal of applied 
feminist research). Further, it is important to observe that the division between the situation B 
and manipulable factors X in TN is not only relative to our abilities, but sometimes also to 
our value-laden decision to keep B constant and to let X change. For example, political 
economics may decide to accept the framework of market economy as given, while 
revolutionary Marxists propose that the capitalist system is abolished.   
 
6. Science, Experts, and Democracy 
 
The relation between science and democracy should be an important theme in the discussion 
about the social aspects of knowledge. Goldman (1999) includes a chapter on democracy, 
where he points out that the successful functioning of representative democracy depends on 
the acquisition of knowledge by particular actors or role-players. In other words, it is 
important that political decision-makers in governments and parliaments are well informed 
and properly advised about the up-to-date results of science. 
 Philip Kitcher’s work Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001) opens a much broader 
perspective on the science –democracy relations, and thereby gives an important service to 
the program of Analytic Social Epistemology. (Note, however, that Kitcher is not included in 
the bibliography of Haddock et al. 2010.) Kitcher’s project describes “well-ordered science” 
which seeks “significant truths”, where scientific significance depends on our contingent but 
“enlightened” interests. This is comparable to Fuller’s (2012) insistence that Critical Social 
Epistemology should investigate “which truths are worth pursuing”. But no compromise 
between ASE and CSE has been achieved so far. Even though Kitcher is willing to reject the 
“scientistic” view of the scientific community as “secular priesthood”, Fuller (2004) bluntly 
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claims that Kitcher, failing to register conflict between science and society, gives science the 
status of the “guarantor of social order” with “a church-like authority”. 
 Fuller’s own project of the “democratization of knowledge” is “to make all things 
knowable to everyone”. CSE should find “more efficient means of reaching comparable and 
superior epistemic ends that would allow, at the limit, anyone to know everything”. This 
means that the public distribution of knowledge should be democratic (see also Fuller, 1993). 
Recall that when CSE was launched in 1987, we did not yet have the World Wide Web. 
Today the digital revolution and the internet have inspired the program of “open science” or 
“Science 2.0”, which aims to make all scientific publications available free online. This is an 
extension of Merton’s principle of “communism” to the Information Age. But nevertheless 
Fuller’s ideal state where everyone could know everything is utopian, since the open 
accessibility of all scientific information would not guarantee that anyone could understand 
this information. So the free electronic distribution of scientific information should be 
complemented with a program of providing science-based education for all. Likewise Fuller’s 
superutilitarianism in developing a new species Homo 2.0 appeals to the values of future 
generations in a speculative manner. 
 Longino (2002b), whose social norms for effective critical interaction within the 
scientific community have a democratic flavor, correctly observes that “Kitcher wants to 
democratize science policy, not science”, since his democratic deliberations concern the 
research agenda and the application of scientific knowledge. It is, indeed, appropriate to 
distinguish the epistemological problem of accepting scientific hypotheses from other stages 
of knowledge production. Kitcher’s well-ordered science is concerned with decisions by 
groups “receiving tutoring from scientific experts and accepting input from all perspectives”, 
but this ideal deliberation deals with the allocation of resources, choice of pursued projects, 
and the translation of results into practical consequences – and these questions belong to 
democratic science and technology policy rather than science itself (cf. Niiniluoto 1999, p. 
298). 
 Kitcher’s “enlightened democracy” is intended to be a middle way between “vulgar 
democracy” (based on majority vote) and elitism (based on internal or external experts). 
However, as an ideal it appears to be unrealistic or too far removed from the actual practices 
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of decision making in science and technology policy. The organization of inquiry is largely 
meritocratic, but at the same time guided by peer review processes. In many democratic 
countries the parliaments allocate resources to independent universities and research funding 
organizations, which then distribute money to researchers and research project on the basis of 
their scientific quality. Assessment of such projects is typically made by panels consisting of 
peers or scholars in the same field. This model is followed also within the European Union by 
the European Research Council (ERC) which finances high-quality basic research. Another 
stream of funding for strategic and applied research is targeted to projects which serve some 
socially relevant function, such as economic competitiveness, health care, and environmental 
protection. It is this area where Kitcher’s notion of well-ordered science has its primary 
application, but even there socially motivated general themes have to translated into research 
questions by skillful scientists. Results of research are then applied in the innovation 
activities of companies. In most countries, the major part of R&D goes to D, i.e., 
technological projects of developing new commercial products. Even though business firms 
may receive some public support for their activities, they make their own decisions about the 
applications of scientific results by following the rules of the market economy.  
 New trends, which to some extend modify this traditional division of labor, include 
the model of the so called “mode 2” research and “user-driven” innovation, where the 
researchers and users work together in the same teams (Gibbons et al. 1994). A similar idea is 
followed in consumer panels and consensus conferences, where scientific experts and the 
potential users of new technological tools and services meet each other. Such panels may also 
assess the risks of new technological products and methods (e.g. power plants, new pharma, 
medical treatments), so that they combine the opinions of scientific experts and ordinary 
citizens (see Shrader-Frechette 1985). In this way, technology assessment taking into account 
all the dimensions of the formula TA = 6E+S (see Section 5) can – and should - have some 
democratic elements. This is one way of interpreting Fuller’s (1993) “democratic 
presumption” that “science can be scrutinized and evaluated by appropriately informed lay 
public”. But this is quite different from epistemological questions about science, so that we 
again see why it is important to have a distinction between science and technology (see 
Section 5). 
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 Finally, let us turn to what Goldman’s considers as the “real epistemological question” 
of justifying truth claims (cf. Haddock et al. 2010). Paul Feyerabend’s (1987), p. 59, principle 
of “democratic relativism” asserts that “citizens and not special groups have the last word in 
deciding what is true or false, useful or useless in society”. We have already seen that citizens 
indeed should have an important role in deciding what is useful or useless in society, i.e., in 
science and technology policy. But truth is not “decided” by citizens, nor by the scientist, 
either, but determined by facts as truth makers (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 297). For the scientific 
realists, the most reliable way of seeking truth is the use of the self-corrective method within 
the scientific community. Thus, for the realists working in the program of ASE the relevant 
question here concerns the process of finding a consensus about a knowledge claim in the 
scientific community. Essentially a generalization of the same problem is in the agenda of 
CSE. Fuller opens his 1988 book with the following question: 
 
“How should the pursuit of knowledge be organized, given that under normal 
circumstances knowledge is pursued by many human beings, each working on a more 
or less well-defined body of knowledge and each equipped with roughly the same 
imperfect cognitive capacities, albeit with varying degrees of access to one another’s 
activities?” 
 
Useful surveys of the procedures of closing disputes in science are given by Engelshardt and 
Caplan (1987). The prospect of resolution of such controversies may be limited in politically 
sensitive social sciences, where the parallel existence of rival schools without much mutual 
communication is quite normal, so that further studies in the humanities should be added to 
the agenda of social epistemology.   
 The process of seeking consensus in science typically involves several stages. (i) 
Students receive scientific education and become members of the scientific community by 
defending their Ph.D. theses. (ii) Post-doctoral researchers advance in their academic career 
by being appointed as professors in universities. (iii) Researchers and research groups apply 
grants for pursuing their projects. (iv) Researchers submit their articles to scientific journals 
and congresses which accept or reject them on the basis of referees’ reports. (v) Published 
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articles are critically debated by other scholars. 
 Here the preparatory stages (i) – (iii) are non-symmetric in the sense that they involve 
the evaluation of candidates by experts. Stage (iv), which is the characteristic way of quality 
assurance by the scientific community, uses peer review as its method. The author and the 
referee as “peers” are in principle on the same level of competence, but their identities are not 
revealed to each other. (v) is the stage of open critical discussion, emphasized by Popper 
(1963). It sometimes leads to an agreement by all or most investigators, but such a temporary 
consensus can be challenged at any time by scholars with new empirical evidence or 
theoretical viewpoints. In this sense, science does not accept any incorrigible dogmas or 
permanent authorities. But still some scholars, whose publications are appreciated and cited 
by their colleagues, can gain cognitive authority as opinion leaders within their own 
disciplines.     
 Critical discussion in the scientific community is not based on voting, but rather the 
strongest argument should win. Against “standpoint theories”, which claim that some special 
group has a privileged position in knowledge-seeking, both Kitcher (2001) and Longino 
(2002a) defend the pluralist stance that adequate and diverse representation of different 
perspectives is necessary for critical discussion. But both admit that “vulgar democracy” 
should be avoided. Longino, who requires that all members of the scientific community 
should be regarded as capable of contributing to its critical dialogue, grants that equality 
should “tempered”, since members of the community differ in their intellectual capacity and 
their cognitive authority with respect to domain-specific questions (ibid., pp. 132-133). So 
the stage (v) of consensual acceptance of knowledge claims is not democratic by its nature. 
Still, the requirement of diversity suggests that the membership in the scientific community 
should be democratized: a career in science should be open to all who have enough talent and 
motivation - independently of their nationality, gender, and wealth (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 298).  
  Can the models of group knowledge, discussed in Section 1, handle this kind of 
consensus with only a “tempered equality”? The problem with the institutional approach of 
ASE is that most of its applications have followed Lewis (1969) in treating collective 
acceptance in terms of egalitarian mutual beliefs or common knowledge. The concept of 
mutual belief or mutual acceptance in the sense of shared we-beliefs (3) is not adequate to 
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reflect the cognitive authority relations that are essential in the production of scientific 
knowledge. But it can be argued that Tuomela’s (1995) concept of proper group beliefs, with 
some modifications (see Section 1), can be employed to give a useful account of science as 
collective knowledge (see Niiniluoto 2003). 
 The need of an alternative to cognitive egalitarianism has been outlined by Hilary 
Putnam (1975) in his discussion of the “division of linguistic labor”: the distinction between 
terms like “elm” and “beech”, or the application of the term “gold”, is known only to a subset 
of the speakers of English. The linguistic community can be considered as a collective body, 
but it divides the “labor” of knowing and employing the meanings of some terms: there are 
experts who know the extension of “gold”, and we others use this term in a way that depends 
on our “structured cooperation” with the experts. Scientific practices are also based upon the 
“division of cognitive labor” (cf. Kitcher 1993, Ch. 8). Polanyi (1967), p. 70, expressed this 
vividly by asking how the results independent inquiries sustain the systematic unity of 
science. Elsewhere he pointed out that each scientist “independently plays his part in 
maintaining this tradition over an immense area of scientific enquiry of which he knows next 
to nothing” primarily through “a chain of mutual appreciation” (Polanyi 1964, p. 16). Thus, 
the unity of science is based on the joint commitment to a method that allows each scientists 
to be “criticized by their own neighbors”. Hegselmann and Krause (2006) are able show by 
their simulations that consensus on the truth can be reached on relatively mild conditions.    
 For these reasons, the institutional definition (7) of scientific knowledge should be 
based upon the definition (4) of proper group beliefs. But in the case of scientific knowledge, 
it should be formulated with variable groups of operative members, i.e., each different 
subgroup has authority with respect to its own domain of research. For example, if we wish 
to know something about distant galaxies, we consult radio astronomers, or in matters about 
medieval cities we ask advice from urban historians. We trust these specialists, since we 
know that they are committed to the use of the critical methods of inquiry. What the scientific 
community collectively knows is based upon the knowledge of such disciplinary subgroups. 
But each subgroup in turn formulates its mutual beliefs on the basis of its best experts who 
usually are the most appreciated and cited scholars in the relevant field.  
 While this kind of approach can be included in the program of ASE, Fuller has in 
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practice acted against it by writing two books which support or at least try to give “a fair run” 
to the pseudoscientific Intelligent Design hypothesis against Darwinism (see Fuller 2008).  
 Assume that the scientific community G (at some moment of time) can be covered by 
the union of the subgroups G1, ..., Gk, so that each Gi has its own legitimate domain Di of 
research questions. These subgroups correspond to subdisciplinary areas of science. The 
groups may have common individual members, especially for interdisciplinary problems, but 
the corresponding research domains should be disjoint. Assume that each Gi has authority in 
G over its own domain Di in the following sense: 
 
(9)  MBG(if p belongs Di and Gi mutually believes that p, then G believes that p)  
 
(cf. (4)). We can further assume that, following (4) again, each group Gi forms its mutual 
beliefs by relying on its best authorities or expert Ei. Then, given these authority assumptions, 
the scientific community G believes that p if and only if p belongs to domain Di and the 
relevant group Gi mutually believes that p. If the group Gi suspends judgment about some 
important research problem, then there is no collective scientific knowledge about that 
matter. 
 Even though the members of the scientific community have mutual respect to each 
other as scientists, the authority structure (9) is different from the Lehrer - Wagner (1981) 
consensus theory: given a specific research problem in Di, there is no chain of positive 
respect going through the whole community G, but rather all the members of G have positive 
respect toward the recognized experts in Gi. 
 Scientific expertise in research domains concerns claims in that area, but also attempts 
to justify these claims by observational, experimental, or theoretical means. It is part of the 
competence of the members of Gi to recognize what counts as evidence for claims in domain 
Di. Hence, the authority assumption (9) applies also to cases where proposition p is replaced 
by justification claims of the form J(j,p). According to (9), if the experts in Ei announce their 
evidence for p (or publish it as open data), after having critically discussed it between 
themselves, the other members of the scientific community ought to accept it. But even in 
cases where these other members cannot understand or check that evidence (e.g., go through 
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a proof of a mathematical theorem, repeat themselves an experiment testing a theory), they 
ought to rely on the testimony of the experts. 
 This model is still idealized at least in assuming an effective (if not perfect) 
communication within the community G. But it is flexible in allowing the experts to change 
their consensus on the basis of new scientific evidence, provided by new observations or 
novel theoretical alternatives. Also all authority position within the scientific community are 
temporary. An expert group may lose old members and recruit new members. Assumption (9) 
only tells what happens when the authority is still secured. Sometimes authorities may be 
transferred as a result of a successful reduction of a problem area to another. Moreover, 
during scientific revolutions, the status of a group as an authority relative to its domain may 
be questioned by other members of the scientific community - and as a result the power 
relations within science as well as the contents of collective scientific knowledge are 
changed. In this way, dynamic changes in the content of scientific knowledge may be 
associated with transformations of social structures in the scientific community.3  
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